Welcome to the web site of "Barack Obama's America," the symposium took place in Padua on January 14-15, 2009, just a few days before the inauguration of the new U.S. President. This site will make available the speakers' papers, delivered at the conference. 

In the picture below, from left, Calabrese, Abramowitz and Fasano.

 

Benvenuti sul sito del convegno "L'America di Barack Obama" che ha avuto luogo a Padova il 14 e 15 gennaio 2009.

Qui sotto i primi paper completi dei relatori. 

Nella foto, da sinistra, Calabrese, Abramowitz e Fasano.

Jeff Madrick on The Economic Emergency (podcast)

DEL PERO: La Politica Estera di Obama

ABSTRACT

L’elezione di Obama è riuscita a ripristinare l’immagine internazionale degli Stati Uniti, pesantemente danneggiata da otto anni di amministrazione Bush. Gli Usa dispongono oggi di una rinnovata forza egemonica, un soft power che continua a costituire una risorsa importante nelle relazioni internazionali. A questo consenso internazionale corrisponde un consenso interno, evidenziato dal tasso di popolarità del nuovo Presidente. Questo doppio consenso, domestico e internazionale, costituisce la condizione fondamentale per la realizzazione di una politica estera efficace e interventista. Si tratta però di due consensi diversi e non complementari. Quello che l’America chiede a Obama è diverso da ciò che il mondo si aspetta dal nuovo Presidente. La capacità di leadership internazionale di Obama sarà in larga misura determinata dalla sua capacità di trovare un equilibrio tra queste due diverse richieste.

Nella lunga campagna presidenziale del 2008 le questioni di politica estera hanno occupato un ruolo meno centrale di quanto non fosse lecito attendersi. Anche su di esse, però, Obama ha costruito le proprie fortune elettorali. È stato sui temi internazionali, e sull’opposizione all’intervento in Iraq, che Obama ha definito il proprio profilo, emergendo durante le primarie come alternativa a Hillary Clinton e raccogliendo così il sostegno dei tanti elettori critici non solo verso le scelte di politica estera di Bush, ma anche nei confronti di Clinton e di altri leader democratici, accusati di non essersi opposti e di avere anzi accettato e legittimato. Conquistata la nomination, Obama è riuscito ad evitare che la politica estera e di sicurezza, tradizionale cavallo di battaglia dei repubblicani, esercitasse un peso rilevante sulle scelte degli elettori. Lo ha aiutato il pieno esplodere della crisi economica, che nelle ultime settimane di campagna elettorale ha dirottato le attenzioni degli americani verso altre issues e priorità (in un sondaggio svolto pochi giorni prima del voto più del 60% degli intervistati aveva definito l’economia come la propria preoccupazione principale; meno del 20% aveva invece indicato Iraq e terrorismo [Pew Research Center]). Nella fase finale della campagna elettorale Obama si è rivelato assai abile nell’offrire agli elettori un discorso di politica estera che, per quanto vago e generico, era maggiormente in sintonia con l’umore del paese. Laddove McCain ha costantemente (e coerentemente) riproposto categorie e, anche, rigidità dell’interventismo neoconservatore, Obama ha fatto proprio un approccio non solo cauto e moderato, ma anche pragmatico e realista. Un realismo, quello reale o presunto di Obama, che molti commentatori hanno finito per celebrare come il miglior antidoto possibile alla deriva ideologica della politica estera statunitense degli ultimi otto anni e al dogmatismo che si asseriva contraddistinguere molte delle posizioni di McCain, dalla sua ostilità verso i negoziati multilaterali sul nucleare nordcoreano (nei quali Bush si è vieppiù impegnato durante il suo secondo mandato) alla sua richiesta di accelerare il processo d’inclusione di Georgia e Ucraina nell’Alleanza Atlantica. In tempi di crisi e di conseguente scetticismo verso politiche estere costose e interventiste, l’adozione di parole d’ordine caute e realiste tende ad essere particolarmente apprezzata dall’opinione pubblica statunitense. Obama è riuscito a fare leva su ciò, colmando almeno in parte il gap di credibilità e competenza sui temi della sicurezza nazionale che, nelle percezioni di una larga maggioranza degli americani, ancora separa democratici e repubblicani.

L’articolazione in due fasi della campagna elettorale – per la nomination e per la presidenza - si è riflessa non solo sul discorso di politica estera di Obama, ma anche sui contenuti della sua proposta. Durante le primarie, Obama si è connotato come un candidato quasi pacifista. L’unico tra i contendenti democratici, a parte il congressman radicale dell’Ohio Dennis Kucinich, a poter dire di avere criticato da subito l’intervento in Iraq e le premesse strategiche che vi sottostavano, Obama ha capitalizzato come meglio non poteva questo elemento. Nel farlo Obama ha radicalizzato inizialmente il proprio messaggio politico, combinando il pacifismo e l’anti-interventismo con frequenti critiche alla filosofia liberista che avrebbe ispirato l’azione internazionale degli Usa nel dopo guerra fredda. Sotto accusa è finito in particolare il Nafta, l’area di libro scambio del Nord America, il cui trattato istitutivo continua a rappresentare uno degli emblemi della nuova politica clintoniana degli anni Novanta. Dettata da ovvie considerazioni elettorali, ma anche dal diverso clima politico e culturale di fine 2007/inizio 2008, questa sterzata radicale di Obama strideva sia con la biografia politica, moderata e finanche centrista, del Senatore dell’Illinois sia con il messaggio che egli aveva cercato inizialmente di proiettare. Nel suo manifesto elettorale di politica estera, pubblicato nell’estate del 2007 dalla rivista “Foreign Affairs”, Obama aveva sì criticato l’azione militare statunitense in Iraq, ma lo aveva fatto nel contesto di una riproposizione, invero piuttosto convenzionale, delle logiche e delle categorie di un internazionalismo liberal che ricordava da vicino quello di Bill Clinton, nel quale si riaffermava il legame inestricabile tra la tutela della sicurezza statunitense, l’estensione della democrazia e la liberalizzazione degli scambi [Obama, 2007]. 

Protezionismo e anti-interventismo sono stati però messi da parte una volta terminate le primarie. Di commercio internazionale, e ancor più di Nafta e accordi bilaterali, si è parlato molto poco, salvo i consueti, vaghi cenni nei programmi dei due candidati alla necessità di promuovere una ulteriore liberalizzazione degli scambi, integrati, nel caso di Obama, dalla sottolineatura della necessità che ciò avvenga solo laddove siano rispettati precisi standard ambientali e lavorativi nei paesi partner degli Stati Uniti. 

L’Iraq è a sua volta uscito dal dibattito elettorale. La stabilizzazione, effettiva o presunta, prodotta dalla nuova strategia del generale Petraeus, la rilevante diminuzione del numero di vittime statunitensi e la certezza di un prossimo ritiro delle truppe americane, di cui andavano definiti solo tempi e forme, hanno tolto l’Iraq dai riflettori. Le posizioni sia di McCain sia di Obama sono risultate superate dai tempi. Entrambi i candidati hanno continuato a ribadire la loro linea – rilancio dell’intervento per McCain, rapido ritiro nel caso di Obama – in una discussione che appariva però ormai scollegata dalla situazione venutasi a determinare sul campo, e che suscitava sempre meno interesse tra gli elettori. 

Da giugno a novembre Obama è così tornato a fare propri codici, analisi e prescrizioni di un approccio liberal alle grandi questioni internazionali, centrato sulla necessità di rafforzare l'impegno internazionalista degli Usa, sull'affermazione del primato del diritto internazionale e sulla sottolineatura dell'importanza di ri-legittimare le grandi organizzazioni internazionali, a partire dalle Nazioni Unite. Obama ha compensato la sua posizione sull’Iraq con l'enfasi posta sulla necessità di rilanciare l’intervento in Afghanistan: il fronte primario della campagna contro il terrorismo, per Obama e i suoi consiglieri, che richiederebbe un maggior impegno da parte sia degli Stati Uniti sia dei loro alleati. Ha bilanciato le sue critiche alla crescita eccessiva delle spese militari con la sollecitazione ad aumentare il numero di uomini in armi, promettendo di arruolare quasi 100mila soldati in più, tra truppe di terra e marines. Ha criticato severamente l’unilateralismo di Bush e Cheney e invocato un rinnovato impegno degli Usa alla collaborazione multilaterale, imposto dalla rete sempre più fitta d’interdipendenze globali, ma anche funzionale alla tutela degli interessi degli Stati Uniti e congruente con i loro valori e ideali. Ha, infine, riproposto una lettura marcatamente liberal ed economicistica delle cause del radicalismo politico, e di quello islamico in particolare, presentate come il portato di arretratezza e sottosviluppo più che di assenza di libertà politiche e civili, come invece sostenuto in molte analisi dell'amministrazione Bush, a partire dalla famosa Dottrina di Sicurezza Nazionale del settembre 2002. Nel farlo è riuscito a sottrarsi al dilemma etico posto da un rigetto tout court dell’interventismo umanitario post-guerra fredda che una precisa svolta realista avrebbe al contrario imposto. Il tutto è avvenuto entro un discorso che, sulle specifiche questioni internazionali e sui tanti teatri di crisi che inevitabilmente coinvolgono gli Stati Uniti, è rimasto estremamente vago e nebuloso, fatta eccezione per alcune proposte in materia di politiche ambientali ed energetiche – su tutte quella di coinvolgere nuovamente gli Stati Uniti nella convenzione quadro dell’Onu sui cambiamenti climatici e di investire con forza in fonti energetiche rinnovabili - che lasciano presagire una marcata discontinuità con gli anni di Bush. 

Vi sono almeno tre spiegazioni della vaghezza delle proposte di Obama in materia di politica estera e di sicurezza. La prima è rappresentata ovviamente dalla convenienza elettorale. A un’opinione pubblica disillusa da otto anni di Bush, e indisposta a sostenere i costi di una politica estera interventista, era meglio offrire un messaggio ambiguo, assai lontano dalle certezze del programma di McCain. La seconda è l’intrattabilità di molti dei problemi con i quali gli Stati Uniti, e chi li guida, devono confrontarsi. La terza è Obama medesimo. L’Obama radicale e, in parte, populista delle primarie era un’Obama assai lontano dall’algido e cauto senatore che molti avevano conosciuto prima del 2007 e che è ritornato una volta conquistata la candidatura. Durante tutta la campagna elettorale post-primarie, Obama ha cercato di proiettare un’aura di moderazione, cautela, pragmatismo e, in ultimo, “presidenzialità”. Vi è riuscito con successo anche rispetto alla politica estera, come si è visto in occasione del viaggio di luglio in Medio Oriente e in Europa, culminato nel bagno di folla di Berlino. Ed è stato aiutato dal contrasto particolarmente stridente tra il ticket Obama-Biden e quello McCain-Palin. Come nelle primarie Obama era riuscito a incarnare il cambiamento, così da giugno è riuscito a intercettare quella richiesta di ordine e moderazione, soprattutto in politica estera, che proveniva da una parte rilevante dell’elettorato. Per quanto paradossale, le convergenti istanze di cambiamento e ordine riflettevano entrambe la sollecitazione a dare un netto segnale di rottura con le scelte di Bush e con il radicalismo che le aveva ispirate. 

La figura di Obama e lo stesso processo elettorale hanno avuto un impatto straordinario fuori dagli Stati Uniti. La vitalità dimostrata dalla democrazia statunitense, la prima, storica elezione di un presidente afro-americano, il coinvolgimento e la partecipazione globale generate dalle elezioni hanno concorso a ripristinare un’immagine, quella degli Stati Uniti, che solo fino a poco tempo fa appariva irrimediabilmente danneggiata. La lunga competizione elettorale ha concorso a mostrare una volta di più la forza egemonica del modello statunitense: la tenuta di un mito – quella dell’America delle mille opportunità, sempre capace di rinascere e risollevarsi – di cui con troppa fretta si era decretato il tramonto. La candidatura di Obama, la mobilitazione elettorale e, infine, l’elezione alla presidenza del senatore dell’Illinois dotano la nuova amministrazione di un soft power - di una forza attrattiva e di una capacità di esercitare un'influenza politica e culturale - la cui rilevanza non può essere sottostimata. I sondaggi compiuti a ridosso del voto sono emblematici. In quasi tutti i paesi del mondo (con la significativa eccezione della Georgia) una maggioranza schiacciante degli intervistati ha dichiarato di preferire Obama a McCain, con percentuali ovviamente bulgare in Africa, ma con maggioranze larghissime anche in Europa, in America Latina e in Giappone. Obama appare pertanto a molti come il presidente di un’America tornata a farsi punto di riferimento e modello per una parte rilevante del resto del mondo [Gallup/Foreign Policy]. 

Conquistata la presidenza, Obama sembra oggi disporre di quel doppio consenso, interno e internazionale, necessario a un presidente per promuovere una politica estera ambiziosa e, laddove necessario, interventista. Gli indici di popolarità del neo-Presidente all’interno degli Stati Uniti sono cresciuti di molto con la sua elezione e raggiungono livelli altissimi. Con l’eccezione di una parte della sinistra più radicale, le scelte fatte finora da Obama sono state valutate molto positivamente. Questo è valso anche per la squadra di politica estera e di sicurezza costruita da Obama, nella quale vi sono esponenti apprezzati della passata amministrazione, come il segretario della Difesa Robert Gates, democratici moderati, come il nuovo segretario di Stato Hillary Clinton, e liberal interventisti legati a Obama, su tutti la nuova ambasciatrice alle Nazioni Unite, Susan Rice. Non sarà facile preservare l’armonia tra figure politicamente forti e il passato, anche quello più recente, è ricco di esempi di amministrazioni ben presto lacerate da conflitti interni e incapaci di esprimere una linea unitaria di politica estera. Per il momento, però, le scelte di Obama hanno contribuito a rafforzarlo politicamente. 

Il consenso alimenta però anche forti aspettative, fuori e dentro gli Stati Uniti. Ed è qui che per Obama si aprono una serie di dilemmi e di problemi. Il doppio consenso di cui Obama gode è stato infatti facilitato proprio dalle ambiguità, dalla vaghezza e, in ultimo, dai silenzi del programma di politica estera del candidato Obama e delle modalità attraverso cui questo programma è stato presentato agli americani e al mondo.

Sul piano interno, Obama ha assecondato quella sollecitazione a ridurre l’impegno e l’esposizione globali degli Stati Uniti. Non si tratta ovviamente d’isolazionismo, come ha frettolosamente affermato qualche commentatore. Nella rete d’interdipendenze odierne l'isolamento non è un'opzione per la principale, ed unica, potenza globale. Quello che oggi una percentuale maggioritaria degli americani chiede è però di abbandonare le radicali declinazioni neconservatrici dell’internazionalismo statunitense, riducendo i costi e gli oneri della leadership mondiale degli Usa. Questo non si applica all’Afghanistan, dove la maggioranza dell’opinione pubblica condivide la convinzione di Obama che sia necessario un maggiore impegno statunitense. L’Afghanistan continua però a essere letto come un problema anche interno degli Stati Uniti: come la prima e decisiva linea del fronte della lotta al terrorismo. Diversa è la situazione rispetto ad altri temi, che qualificheranno o meno in senso multilaterale, cooperativo e internazionalista la politica estera dell’amministrazione Obama. Nel suo programma elettorale e in molti interventi pubblici, Obama ha enfatizzato l’obbligo per gli Stati Uniti non solo di collaborare all’interno delle grandi organizzazioni internazionali, Nazioni Unite su tutte, ma anche di appoggiare le riforme necessarie per adattare tali organizzazioni al mutato scenario internazionale. È però difficile immaginare un forte sostegno interno a questa posizione; non a caso, Obama e Biden hanno temperato il loro internazionalismo multilateralista con frequenti sottolineature della possibilità che gli Usa agiscano da soli se chiamati a farlo. Ed è indicativo come proposte che in Europa sono osservate con perplessità e malcelata sufficienza, come quella di creare una “Lega delle democrazie” della quale non farebbero ovviamente parte Cina e Russia, che integri, e se necessario surroghi, l’Onu siano invece prese sul serio e dibattute negli Usa, anche in circoli e think tanks vicine al neo-Presidente. In una situazione di crisi e difficoltà come quella attuale appare inoltre assai inverosimile che il Congresso e gli elettori sostengano una politica di aiuti e di sostegno allo sviluppo quale quella preconizzata nel programma di Obama. È anzi probabile che ad antiche tensioni se ne aggiungano di nuove, in particolare nei negoziati per la liberalizzazione e la regolamentazione multilaterale degli scambi. Obama ha messo da parte molte delle parole d’ordine protezionistiche delle primarie, ma per scelta e necessità non può non appoggiare forme di sostegno pubblico ad alcuni grandi settori industriali in crisi, aprendo un processo destinato a rendere ancora più arduo il dialogo all’interno del Wto, sia con l’Europa sia con le economie emergenti. Infine, la convinzione che l’intervento in Iraq sia stato un grave errore rende paradossalmente più difficile un rinnovato impegno degli Stati Uniti nel teatro mediorientale, laddove qualsiasi soluzione passa giocoforza attraverso la disponibilità della nuova amministrazione a impegnarsi per far ripartire il processo di pace israelo-palestinese.

Quel che gli americani chiedono a Obama di non fare (o di fare con molta cautela) è però ciò che gran parte del mondo invece si attende dalla nuova amministrazione. Fuori dagli Stati Uniti l’oggetto del dibattere non è l’opportunità o meno di un maggior intervento statunitense nelle grandi crisi internazionali, ma le modalità di tale intervento, la cooperazione con altri soggetti nella sua promozione e la definizione degli obiettivi al cui servizio esso deve essere posto. Agli Usa si chiede di abbandonare l’ostentato unilateralismo del primo Bush, che si è peraltro molto affievolito nel secondo mandato. E si chiede esplicitamente un maggior coinvolgimento nelle organizzazioni internazionali e nei negoziati multilaterali, nella convinzione che solo un maggior attivismo statunitense possa sbloccare una serie d’impasse (Doha round e riforma delle Nazioni Unite su tutte) che hanno concorso a congelare il processo di disciplinamento e gestione consensuale della globalizzazione, rendendo più difficile la collaborazione tra i principali soggetti del sistema internazionale. A questo si aggiunge l'auspicio che gli Stati Uniti diano un contributo maggiore a iniziative multilaterali di sostegno allo sviluppo e lotta alla povertà. Per ovvie ragioni, le speranze suscitate in molti paesi africani dall’elezione di Obama sono altissime, e sono state alimentate dall’impegno del nuovo presidente ad adottare una serie di misure – dalla cancellazione del debito dei paesi più poveri al raddoppiamento della cifra destinata agli aiuti per i paesi più poveri – i cui beneficiari principali dovrebbero essere proprio gli stati africani. Infine, si dà per scontato che Obama rimuova da subito alcuni dei simboli più tangibili e, agli occhi dell’opinione pubblica internazionale, odiosi della campagna globale contro il terrorismo promossa dall’amministrazione Bush, a cominciare dal carcere di Guantanamo. 

Obama soddisferà alcune di queste speranze. Lo farà però solo in parte, e sarà attento a trarre il massimo profitto possibile da gesti ad alto contenuto simbolico ma basso impatto politico interno. La campagna contro il terrorismo, ad esempio, cambierà alcuni dei suoi tratti e certo sarà presentata in forme diverse all’opinione pubblica mondiale. Permarranno però alcuni elementi della legislazione d’emergenza post-11 settembre. Guantanamo sarà chiusa, ma si creerà molto probabilmente un sistema di corti speciali per processare molti dei detenuti accusati di terrorismo. Una simile scelta sarà giustificata in nome di ragioni legali e investigative. Peseranno tuttavia su di essa considerazioni di ordine politico, visto che una parte rilevante dell’opinione pubblica statunitense non condivide lo sdegno internazionale nei confronti di Guantanamo e lo considera anzi lo strumento attraverso cui Bush ha ottenuto uno dei pochi successi nella lotta al terrorismo. Un recente sondaggio ci offre un dato particolarmente rilevante e, per noi europei, sorprendente: a fronte di un 27% di statunitensi favorevole alla chiusura di Guantanamo, rimane un 44% di contrari e un 29% di indecisi [Quinnipiac, 2008].

Una certa disillusione in Europa sarà quindi inevitabile. È assai probabile che Obama, “l'americano più popolare in Europa dai tempi di Elvis” secondo la giornalista Anne Applebaum, riesca inizialmente a limitare le ricadute politiche di tale disillusione. A dispetto delle tensioni degli ultimi anni, e della diffusione di speculari pregiudizi anti-americani e anti-europei in ampi strati delle opinioni pubbliche europea e statunitense, i fattori che legano e accomunano Europa e Stati Uniti rimangono molto forti. L'Europa è il partner naturale dell'amministrazione Obama nella promozione di un'agenda internazionalista liberale che su alcuni temi – ambiente in particolare – sembra già far intravedere una nuova convergenza transatlantica. Per peso politico e diplomatico, capacità militari e livello di cooperazione e integrazione, i paesi europei rimangono inoltre gli interlocutori privilegiati di Washington e gli unici alleati con i quali siano possibili forme di azione congiunta quale quella promossa in Afghanistan. 

Vari fattori, strutturali e contingenti, potrebbero però alimentare nuove difficoltà nelle relazioni euro-americane. Relazioni, queste, fortemente asimmetriche e sbilanciate, in termini d'interessi e di percezioni reciproche. Per quel che rappresenta e per quello che è, per il suo mercato e la sua forza militare, per il suo hard power e il suo soft power, l'America continua infatti a essere molto più importante per l'Europa di quanto l'Europa non lo sia per l'America. 

Parlare di Europa al singolare è inoltre un ovvio artifizio che proprio i rapporti con gli Stati Uniti, e gli effetti non di rado laceranti che essi hanno sull'unità europea, aiutano a disvelare. Una parte d'Europa - la “vecchia Europa” nella sprezzante definizione datane dal primo segretario della Difesa di Bush, Donald Rumsfeld – guarda con favore alla probabile decisione di Obama di porre in stand-by sia l'ulteriore processo di ampliamento dell'Alleanza Atlantica sia il dispiegamento di un limitato sistema anti-missilistico in Polonia e nella Repubblica Ceca. Decisioni, queste, che contribuirebbero a un miglioramento dei rapporti con la stessa Russia, ma che finirebbero per alimentare il risentimento di alcuni degli stati europei che maggiormente hanno sostenuto gli Usa negli ultimi anni.

Infine, permangono ambiti e problemi sui quali la differenza di vedute tra Europa e Stati Uniti rischia addirittura d’aumentare in conseguenza dell'elezione di Obama. Il nuovo presidente ha già fatto chiaro che chiederà ai partner europei un maggior impegno militare in Afghanistan e un contributo diplomatico più forte nei negoziati sul nucleare iraniano. Se la dichiarata disponibilità di Obama a riaprire un serio dialogo con l'Iran potrebbe facilitare una comune posizione atlantica, l'Afghanistan sembra invece aprire seri problemi nei rapporti tra Usa ed Europa. Perché da parte europea si crede che la strategia adottata in Afghanistan vada rivista; perché qualsiasi governo europeo deve fare i conti con l'impopolarità di un aumento dell'impegno militare in Afghanistan; perché negli Usa vi è forte la convinzione che il contributo operativo europeo nella campagna contro i talebani sia insufficiente e che l'Europa si sia col tempo sottratta alla proprie responsabilità e sia venuta meno ai propri impegni. Sullo sfondo, agiscono alcune grandi questioni – l'utilizzo della forza militare per promuovere processi di democratizzazione e nation building e la definizione delle responsabilità dei problemi mediorientali – rispetto alle quali la diversità di vedute (e, anche, di pregiudizi) tra Europa e Stati Uniti continua a essere marcata e molto profonda. 

Il gap tra aspettative e possibilità è quindi particolarmente forte. Perché le aspettative generate dall’elezione di Obama sono altissime, dentro e fuori gli Stati Uniti. Perché si tratta di aspettative diverse e non facilmente conciliabili. Perché l’attuale quadro internazionale e le difficoltà economiche che gli Usa devono fronteggiare limitano le possibilità d’azione degli Stati Uniti sulla scena internazionale.

Obama e i suoi consiglieri ne sono ovviamente consapevoli. Dopo il 4 novembre hanno più volte cercato di attenuare queste aspettative, coscienti però che sono proprio esse a nutrire quel soft power - quella rinnovata capacità egemonica - di cui l’America oggi dispone. La sottolineatura forte delle tante interdipendenze che legano i diversi soggetti del sistema internazionale, limitandone la sovranità, e della necessità conseguente di agire secondo canali consensuali e multilaterali sembra anzi esprimere la consapevolezza che proprio questi canali costituiscono lo strumento storico attraverso cui gli Stati Uniti hanno tutelato i propri interessi, perseguito i propri obiettivi e, in ultimo, consolidato la propria leadership. Oggi, il tornare a farlo è una necessità ancor prima che una scelta. Ma appare anche l’unica opzione possibile, per preservare un’influenza globale che – qualsiasi parametro si voglia utilizzare per misurarla – si è grandemente ridotta nell’ultimo decennio. 

RIFERIMENTI BIBLIOGRAFICI

Barack Obama, Renewing American Leadership, “Foreign Affairs”, July/August 2007 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html?mode=print) 

Gallup/Foreign Policy, If the World Could Vote (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/gallup/).

Pew Research Center, Inside Obama’s Sweeping Victory, 5 November 2008 (http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1023/exit-poll-analysis-2008).

Quinnipiac University National Poll, Voters Say 'Yes We Can' With High Hopes For Obama, 12 November 2008 (http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1284.xml?What=Guantanamo&strArea=;&strTime=3&ReleaseID=1228#Question015)

MICHEL: A Green and Pink Revolution. Putting Women on the Road to Recovery

As more than one observer of the current scene has opined, “a crisis is a terrible thing to waste.” There is no question that economic disasters cause widespread destruction and human anguish, but they can also—if properly handled—provide openings for social and economic reform on an unprecedented scale. The New Deal is, of course, the instance that most people have in mind when they speak of good emerging from disaster, but a rapid survey of US social and economic history suggests that the New Deal was the exception, not the rule. No other economic disaster has produced either immediate responses or long-term outcomes on the same scale. Thus it is not surprising that President-elect Obama and his transition team are giving the New Deal some close study as they develop their models for economic recovery.

Few historians would claim, however, that the New Deal was an unmitigated good. While many of FDR’s policies were effective in bringing immediate relief to the unemployed, putting the economy back on track, and paving the way for innovative social provisions and reforms that have endured, some of these same policies also—however inadvertently—created inequalities, particularly when it came to gender roles. Thus while historians are heartened to discover that Obama believes he can learn from the past, we fear that by emulating earlier policies, he may also reproduce the outdated assumptions on which they were based, assumptions, for example, about women’s need for employment support. As a result, while Obama promises to repair our crumbling roads and bridges (many of them dating back to the 1930s) and expand our “green” economy, there are, as Linda Hirshman commented in the New York Times a few weeks ago, “almost no women on this road to recovery.” For this reason, feminist scholars and activists have called on the President-elect and his team to think more carefully about the gendered implications of the policies he is proposing, lest he reproduce the inequities of the New Deal along with its undeniable successes.

How the New Deal Failed Women

How, exactly, did the New Deal treat women? In setting up work relief programs in the 1930s, federal officials used the following rule of thumb: “For unskilled men, we have the shovel. For unskilled women, we have only the needle.” Men were assigned to construction jobs, women to textile production and various types of service work, and men commonly earned more than women. At first glance, it seems that New Deal policies simply reflected the biases of the time: the work done by men--building roads and bridges--was regarded as more valuable than that done by women--nursing, teaching, child care, and housework, not because of any inherent qualities but because it was assumed that men were supporting families, while women were not. But if one probes more deeply, it becomes apparent that New Deal officials ignored some glaring facts about women’s responsibilities in formulating their policies.

The facts are these. In response to the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt and his administration launched a series of innovative programs that brought relief to millions and helped to stabilize what was one of the world’s largest economies at the time. Among the most popular were public works projects that created jobs for some 15 million out-of-work Americans. From 1933 through 1943, New Deal work agencies such as the federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Civil Works Administration, and the Works Progress Administration employed from 1.4 to 4.4 million people each month. Most of those who got jobs were white men, reflecting officials’ assumptions that they should receive preference because they had families to support, while women merely earned “pin money.” Yet in the 1930s, some four million women were also out of work, and they, too had mouths to feed. New Dealers estimated that one out of six urban families was supported solely by a female wage-earner; among African Americans, the rate was twice that. Female officials in FDR’s administration (along with his wife, Eleanor) believed that women should also have the means to achieve financial independence, but the men who led the effort subscribed to the ideal of the male breadwinner and acted accordingly.

In general, women presented what WPA officials called “project trouble.” Because they considered manual labor “unsuitable” for women—at least for white women (the majority of wage-earning women of color at this time were either agricultural or domestic workers)--sewing rooms appeared to be the logical solution. Still, there were problems: sewing rooms could accommodate only a limited number of women, and working conditions were poor. Indeed, to some reformers of the day, they seemed little better than sweatshops. Yet because of its gender suitability, “the needle” became women’s employment of last resort.

At the same time, officials devised other measures to uphold men’s position as chief breadwinners. They sought to keep to a minimum the number of women certified as eligible for work relief. In 1932, this bias became formalized in the Economy Act, which limited civil service positions to one per family. Passage of the law led to the immediate firing of some 1200 women workers and prevented thousands more from being hired in public employment over the next decade. By January of 1934, only 300,000 out of four million jobless women had found public employment—about 12 percent. At its height, the New Deal employed less than a fifth of all women who were eligible for work relief. Moreover, because federal wages were based on prevailing rates, pay differentials between women and men persisted, with women earning on average 51 percent of what men did. 

This did not bother male New Dealers, who generally subscribed to the idea that women should access federal support through marriage. Yet the gender gap was also reflected in federal programs for unemployed youths. The CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps) set up hundreds of wilderness camps where young unemployed men could earn wages for replenishing forests and reclaiming land (the many trails, cabins, and benches we enjoy in national parks today are the result of their labor.) While these camps were racially segregated, they did pay whites and blacks equally. But there were no CCC camps for women. Instead, Hilda Worthington Smith, a veteran educator of labor women, managed to find enough federal funds to set up fewer than 100 summer camps for young jobless women, where they received paltry allowances rather than wages and focused on training in civic virtues rather than actual labor. Despite the lack of emphasis on preparation for employment, sizeable proportions of camp participants did find jobs at the end of each summer, a tribute more to their determination than to federal policy.

The women’s camps ended up serving some 8500 youths, the men’s, 2.5 million. But in 1937, WPA director Harry Hopkins abruptly terminated the women’s camps, deeming them “too expensive.” Support for the CCC camps continued. The significance of this blatant discrimination did not escape Hilda Smith. “The CCC campus with their millions of dollars for wages, educational work, travel, and supervision constantly reminded me of what we might do for women from these same families,” she noted. “As so often the case, the boys get the breaks, the girls are neglected.” 

Similar patterns appeared in other New Deal programs, most notably the WPA. By its end in 1943, eight million men and women--one fifth of the workforce--had labored to improve the nation's infrastructure as well as beautify cities and spread the arts. WPA employees built 2,500 hospitals, 5,900 schools, 1,000 airports, and 13,000 playgrounds. But women made up only one-sixth of the WPA’s rolls. 

White women were relatively well represented in the “white-collar” division of the WPA, which was responsible for education, surveys, recreation, and the famous programs in the arts. As teachers, nurses, and librarians, they made up from one third to one half of the white-collar employees. People of color, however, held only five percent of these jobs. Most women were assigned to traditional "women's work"--domestic service projects, sewing rooms, semi-skilled nursing services. Minority women were confined to the bottom rung, given the most menial tasks. When cuts came, women were usually the first to be let go, on the assumption that they could qualify for the benefits afforded them through the newly created Aid to Dependent Children program—what became known as “welfare.” Officials overlooked the fact that ADC allotments were even more meager than what they had been able to earn through WPA jobs.

On the whole, then, the New Deal was not a new deal for all women. While it afforded some white women professional opportunities, it generally restricted them to “feminized” lines of work, and it excluded women of color from those occupations almost entirely. By minimizing young women’s access to job training through projects like the CCC camps as well as experience in different types of WPA jobs, it foreclosed women’s future occupational advancement and reinforced assumptions about gender roles and responsibilities for family support. It also crystallized racialized and gendered patterns in the division of labor in American society. Finally, by privileging men in employment programs while diverting women to public assistance, the New Deal created a gendered split that would continue to haunt domestic policymaking for decades. 

Old Patterns, New Realities

Thus while New Deal programs offer models the Obama team might wish to emulate, they should be wary of repeating the mistakes made by their predecessors. At the same time, they must take into account the ways in which American society and its economy have changed over the past seven and a half decades. For one thing, since enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOA—welfare reform) in 1996, the gendered distinction between employment and welfare policy no longer holds. Now, at least in theory, low-income mothers as well as fathers are expected to seek jobs rather than depend on public assistance to support themselves and their children. Given the impact of the recession, Congress may decide to reduce pressure on welfare recipients by easing their employment requirements, but this will not help the large percentage of women who bear financial responsibility for themselves and their families with no public assistance. Any equitable job-creation plan must provide for women as well as men by attending to the occupations in which women predominate. Today women make up 46 percent of the U.S. labor force, and they are almost as likely as men to be the principal supporters of their families. Currently over 70 percent of both married and single mothers hold jobs, earning money that is vital to paying mortgages and putting food on the table. 

While women’s unemployment rates are slightly lower than men’s (5.9% vs. 7.2%), women tend to be less resilient than men in dealing with joblessness. In general, women’s incomes are still considerably lower than men’s. A child care worker, for example, earns on average $9.46 per hour, or $19,670 per year, while the average wage rate for a construction worker is $14.88 per hour, or $30,950 per year. Because women, are more likely to be employed in part-time and casualized occupations, they are less likely to be given severance packages and tend to have lower savings than men. This means, among other things, that they are less likely to be able to purchase COBRA plans to provide their families with health insurance until they find another job. (Over the past year, some 1.2 million children have lost health insurance as a result of parents’ unemployment.) With less of a financial cushion and fewer job prospects, women experience greater difficulty in dealing with the extended economic downturn. 

Yet some in the Obama administration are using women’s lower rates of unemployment as a rationale for marginalizing them as they design plans for economic recovery. I am not suggesting that Obama and his team are deliberately excluding women from the recovery plan, but rather that they are not adequately considering women’s occupational patterns and skill sets, or the types of social services (such as child care and after-school programs) that women need to be satisfactorily employed. 

According to members of the transition team, the plan contains multiple components. In addition to public works (the famous “pick and shovel” jobs), such as school construction and renovation as well as roads and bridges, it includes investments in energy-saving “green technology,” and in health care financing and reform. On a purely economic level, this makes good sense. With much of America’s heavy industry relocated offshore and the bulk of consumer goods arriving on container ships, it is clear that domestic manufacturing is not going to provide a path out of the current economic crisis. To be successful, a recovery plan must go beyond the country’s immediate needs to provide sustainable patterns for the future. It must, in other words, focus on jobs that cannot be outsourced, as well as those that open up new directions for economic growth. Obama’s proposals for infrastructure renewal as well as “green jobs” and health care reform clearly reflect these concerns. 

But how well do they accommodate women’s need for employment? Some will say that all of these jobs should—and can—be open to women. This would be fine in principle, were it not for the fact that, despite several decades of efforts to train women for “non-traditional” employment and professions, very few are prepared to take up jobs in construction or engineering, the fields that are most likely to expand under the proposed plan. True, women may be trained to do such work in the future, but this will not help them in the short run.

The Benefits of a Pink and Green Recovery Plan

In order to provide women employment security, the recovery plan must directly focus on the fields in which women are currently concentrated, namely, health, education, and various forms of caring and service work—in other words, the types of work that are performed in the buildings to be built, or that are generated by increased employment in infrastructure creation. (It has been estimated that every job in construction spins off 1.6 jobs in service occupations of one kind or another.) Such jobs typically pay less than positions in male-dominated occupations, and many feature low wages, irregular hours and assignments, physical and mental stress, and few or no fringe benefits. Workers in occupations such as home health care are treated as independent contractors and denied basic rights such as paid sick days and paid vacations and holidays. All such work should be regularized and regulated 

Federal investments in these fields would carry the double benefit of “doing well by doing good.” That is, they would not only provide employment for the jobless (primarily female), but they would also help to augment the nation’s social capital. Now is clearly an opportune moment for implementing worthy policy initiatives that have been stagnating for decades and implementing promising ideas of more recent vintage. With federal dollars, the U.S. could, for example, finally begin to approximate other advanced market democracies by offering affordable high-quality child care for working families and quality long-term care for the elderly, areas in which it has long lagged behind. Such programs are more urgently needed now than ever, as recent reports indicate that the recession has forced many families to forego both child and elder day care, leaving vulnerable people on their own, or in the care of others not able to provide adequately for them. At the same time, a socially oriented recovery plan could provide openings for new policy goals such as healthier school breakfast and lunch programs and nutritional information programs to accompany food stamps.

The area of education is one that lends itself particularly well to both fostering employment for women, and doing well by doing good, but the Obama administration must plan carefully in order to achieve these multiple goals. Investment in new or renovated school buildings will not directly help the majority of women, whereas investment in educational services will. Reducing class size, restoring arts, music, and physical education (programs that were being cut even before the current crisis), and adding new programs such as pre-school and child care can provide immediate employment for out-of-work teachers and teachers’ aides with appropriate training. Adding or upgrading cafeterias to include gardens, nutrition education, and “locovore” initiatives can open up new jobs, many of which would require only on-the-job training or associate degrees. 

One obstacle that might slow down such investments is the structure of American governance, which relegates control of K-12 education to state and local bureaucracies, leaving little room for federal oversight. Yet state and local systems are seldom adverse to initiatives that bring federal funds into their coffers, and with budgets in crisis, they are hardly like to turn away new money. Congress may choose to channel funds through existing state bureaucracies or give them directly to local school systems if they encounter resistance. While the former may be more efficient, the latter would allow for greater flexibility and encourage greater program creativity. 

At the same time, many policy experts, both feminist and otherwise, have warned that higher education is at great risk and called for direct injection of funds into state budgets to maintain these programs. Here again, such investments can achieve multiple goals. In the short term, they can reverse the outflow of jobs, reduction of incomes, and increased work loads that many state governments are currently implementing to offset budget shortfalls. Measures such as massive lay-offs, mandatory unpaid furlough days and/or higher teaching loads, and failure to replace retirees lower the quality of education and must be ended as quickly as possible. In the long term, infusions of federal funding could be used to add or augment existing training programs in early childhood and K-12 teaching—measures that would enhance the quality of education, not only for students in higher ed, but also for the students they will encounter once they themselves become teachers. Federal funds could also be used to provide stipends for trainees in the types of school-based or community food programs described above, and/or to defray tuition costs for community college degrees, many of which have immediate practical applications. (In conjunction with this, Congress should immediately restore TANF recipients’ right to pursue education, something that was summarily—and foolishly--stripped away when the program was implemented.) All of these initiatives could depend on federal funds as seed money, but eventually, assuming at least some degree of economic recovery, states and localities would be able to take over funding, and the jobs would become part of the nation’s permanent social capital infrastructure. At least at the outset, the federal government should exercise careful oversight and work to bring “best practices” to light, so that ideas can be shared across the country. 

Similar opportunities—and impediments—face the Obama administration in other fields dominated by women, namely, health care, elder and child care, and care for those with disabilities. Because much more of this work tends to be privatized, women in these occupations are more likely to face poor working conditions, but for the same reason, it may be more difficult for the federal government to intervene. At least one model is, however, readily available, namely the more than seven thousand public health clinics currently treating more than 16 million Americans in underserved areas, many of them established, surprisingly, under the Bush administration. Widely recognized for their efficiency as well as the respect with which they treat patients, such clinics also offer excellent working conditions for employees. Other models for community and neighborhood care centers—whether for young children, the elderly, or the disabled—including satellite facilities offering support for home-based caregivers, may be found across the OECD countries. 

Here, too, reforms will end up doing well by doing good, providing or improving jobs for women while augmenting social capital. With federal funds and oversight, it is much more likely that such goals will be reached. The need for investments in child care and health care for the young and those of working age is obvious: to create and maintain a productive labor force. For children, as the economist James Heckman has argued, early interventions such as high-quality child care and vigilant health care are key to offsetting the effects of poverty and social disadvantage and enabling them to become effective members of society. For all workers, but especially those who are parents, such provisions lower stress, absenteeism, and tardiness, leading to greater productivity. But the need for investments in elder care and care for those with disabilities should be equally obvious: to exemplify the values of mutual respect and responsibility among the members of our society and to demonstrate that no member need fear that she will lose her right to be treated with respect and dignity, no matter what her age, income, or condition.

Indeed, many if not most of the occupations in which women predominate not only provide them with employment but also contribute to the physical and mental well-being and productivity of the entire society. For years now, policymakers have been discussing ways to achieve “work-family balance” in order to reduce the stress involved in women’s responsibility for both wage-earning and caring for family members. Now is the time to establish, expand, and improve social services such as child and elder care which are essential if women are to gain the right to participate in the labor market on an equal basis with men without creating a “care deficit” in our society. In other words, we must begin to pay the true cost of caring work, much of which is now provided, unpaid, by American women.

Federal planning, funding, coordination, and regulation are the most rapid and efficient way to achieve this transformation. While investment in services may seem—indeed is—less concrete than investment in infrastructure or green technology, it is equally necessary at this moment in time, and the payoff in terms of human capital will be equally significant. Much of this type of reform can easily be coordinated with “pick and shovel” and green technology projects; officials should simply be required to do “gender impact assessments” of specific programs, as they now assess environmental impacts. Such assessments should consider the gender balance in the jobs required to complete the project and to run it once it is completed. If, for example, the bulk of the work needed to construct a child care center will be done by men but the services it offers will be provided by women, then the project will be in balance. (Note: both types of work should be regarded as of comparable work, and therefore receive equal compensation.) If the care services themselves benefit still other women workers, then the entire project might earn bonus “gender equity credit”—credit which could be traded, like carbon offsets.

Would this be a hard sell? I think not, if the Obama administration is willing to put its weight behind such investments. In the name of economic recovery, billions of dollars have already been poured into Wall Street vehicles, with negligible impact on the situations of average Americans, and now Congress is poised to pour in billions more. Surely Americans will respond positively to programs that promise not only to achieve gender equity (a goal that is, alas, still not a high priority for many) but also---probably more importantly--to improve their everyday lives and wellbeing.

Obama is, by all reports, preparing to ask for fresh infusions of funding to create new jobs and new programs. In recent days, his transition team has taken pains to register Americans’ views on health care reform, setting up thousands of community meetings, many of them aimed toward giving former campaign activists a voice in policy making. Similar efforts could and should be made to gather women’s views about their employment opportunities, working conditions, and the kinds of provisions they need to balance work and family obligations. 

Perhaps such “listening tours” will provide valuable new information and policy ideas, but in my view they are useful as political tools—to mobilize support—than for shaping policy. To a great extent, we already know what needs to be done. Social services and provisions must be expanded, the cost to consumers of provisions like health care and child care must be reduced (child care, for example, currently costs from $4000 to $10,000 per child per year—close to half of an unskilled worker’s annual income), and compensation, benefits, and working conditions for those who provide the services must be substantially improved. A comprehensive approach to such initiatives—one that includes attention to those who provide as well as those who receive—can achieve all of these goals. Just as Social Security emerged from the ashes of the Great Depression, so gender equity and a new work-family configuration can emerge from the current crisis—social reforms that can set us on the right course for the rest of the 21st century. 

Sonya Michel

Department of History

University of Maryland, College Park, USA

GHILARDUCCI: Obama’s Pension Proposals and America’s Retirement Crises

Abstract

The new Congress and the President will react swiftly to the economic recession and will be pressed to restructure the collapsing financial order. Unfortunately, there is no sign they will save the American pension system that relies on individual retirement plans, which are based on that very same deteriorating financial order. 

Changes in the nation’s pension system in the last two decades means that the upcoming generation of retirees will be worse off than their parents and grandparents. This forecast is assured for many because in the last three months of 2008 workers’ and retirees’ lives upside down as retirement accounts have lost a third of their income. Older workers and retirees are vulnerable and panicked and the stimulus package will do nothing to make their incomes more secure. The proposals to expand individual private retirement accounts put forth by Candidate Obama would make the nation’s retirement crises worse. Individual accounts do not deliver what Americans need or want, a safe source of retirement income. 

I propose a system of mandated retirement accounts that will supplement Social Security and whose rates of returns will be guaranteed by the government, the money will be locked up until retirement, and the distribution will be in the form of an annuity.

Candidate Obama proposed a pension reform system that is already outdated. He proposed “Automatic IRAs” employers with 10 or more employees, who do not already sponsor a retirement plan, would automatically deduct contributions from their workers’ paychecks and deposit them in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). The employer chooses the financial service company to manage their accounts – just like in 401(k) plans or workers could choose their own. Workers could opt out if they choose. Automatic IRAs would make matters worse because it expands the system of individual retirement accounts that is riddled with major problems: because the contributions are voluntary workers don’t save enough in them and employers stop contributions when they want to and most workers withdraw funds before they retirement; rates of return for these accounts are low because workers are not professional investors and the fees are hidden and are high since they are charged on a retail basis; investing as individuals, workers take on financial risk, the risk the market does poorly when they reach old age (one person can’t insure against that risk); and, finally, even if the worker did everything right and has ten times earnings at the end of their work life they face the vexing problem of how to distribute it until their death, which fundamentally is unknown. Private annuities are unpopular because insurance companies charge voluntary purchasers as if they will be the longest lived members of the population. 

Retirement Systems based on Individual Retirement Plans Fail

401(k) plans are named after the section of the tax code passed in 1978 intended to help high- income management save tax free, they have spread to the rest of the population but they are not suited for most workers. When many companies stopped their 401(k) contributions in late 2008s many people, for the first time, realized that employers were not required, beyond Social Security, to contribute anything towards a pension system. And for people with a pension plan at work, it was the first time they realized that only 50% of workers had any other pension system besides Social Security. (About 89% of union members have an employer pension, while less than 40% of non union workers have a pension at work.) 

IRAs and 401(k) plans did not expand pension coverage past the 50 percent of the workforce covered since the 1970s, nor did they increase national savings rates. However 401(k) plans do add to the profits and growth of the financial sector and consumed ever-increasing tax expenditures from the U.S. Treasury. 

I propose replacing 401(k) plans and IRAs with a much more valuable and efficient retirement program: the Guaranteed Retirement Accounts (GRAs).

Taxpayers Lose with 401(k)s and IRAs

 

401(k) plans are highly subsidized by the U.S. government with the intention of raising savings rates and helping people who need the help secure retirement security. Yet individual retirement accounts produce a lower level of savings compared the system of employer pensions they replaced. 

What is unfortunate is that many Americans are not aware of the large amount of money the U.S. Government spends to subsidize this system that yields little social benefit. Taxpayers are not told clearly who gets the subsidies and whether or not the money spent is used wisely. This is because the U.S. government uses a back door method to subsidize certain activities. It uses “tax expenditures” – the value of the Tax Code’s exemption of income generated for certain activities – to encourage workers and the nation’s business owners to spend their income in socially approved ways. 

In 2007, Social Security and Medicare cost $800 billion. Tax expenditures for retirement plans – traditional employer pensions (defined benefit plans), 401(k) plans, Individual Retirement Accounts, other savings vehicles dedicated for disbursement at older ages, and exemptions of Social Security and other federal pensions from tax – totaled over $156 billion in 2007. 

In 2004, taxes not collected on pension contributions and earnings equal a fourth of annual Social Security contributions and, at over $114 billion, are perversely larger than household saving of over $102 billion. The tax breaks were supposed to expand pension coverage and increase retirement security.

Pension tax breaks are deductions from income. Therefore, high-income earners in higher tax brackets get a greater benefit from these deductions than low-income workers. If a lawyer earning $200,000 makes a $1,000 contribution to his 401(k) plan, he reduces his income tax by $350. If his receptionist, earning $20,000, makes the same $1,000 contribution (which is much less likely), she will save only $150 in taxes. The Brookings Institution and Urban Institute calculate that the three percent of taxpayers (i.e., those with incomes over $200,000 per year) get 20 percent of the tax subsidies. And, for all this effort, the nation gets no extra savings. At most, this complicated system creates economic activity when accountants happily transfer money between taxed accounts to tax-sheltered accounts and taxpayers foot the bill. The value of tax expenditures for 401(k) plans is projected to grow 49 percent while those for traditional plans are projected to fall by 2.1 percent between 2009 and 20013. (The estimated tax expenditures for 401(k) plans, Individual Retirement Accounts, and Keogh plans in 2009 is estimated to be $75.1 billion and for defined benefit plans $45.7 billion.) 

Four trends moved in favor of Americans’ retirement savings rates being higher in the 1990s than they ever before: more tax breaks, an older and educated workforce, higher income workers getting the largest income increases, and the income effect. But the switch to individual accounts swamped these favorable factors.

First: Congress had relentlessly expanded tax breaks for retirement savings since the 1980s; the value of the tax expenditures for retirement savings is at an all-time high of $110 billion, while the effectiveness of such tax breaks is at an all-time low. (See the discussion below and EBRI’s analysis of the tax expenditures for pension and savings plans ). This alone should have boosted savings if taxpayers were getting their money’s worth. Secondly, retirement savings should have been higher just because the American workforce is more educated and older than ever before and people with more education save more than those with less education and middle-aged workers save more than any other age group. Third: High income people have higher savings rates and the richest Americans have gained the most income since the 1990s. And fourth, the income effect should have boosted national retirement savings. As national income grows, the demand for normal goods grow, because when people have money they buy more of what they want, from Ipods to better health and retirement “leisure.” This income effect was displayed in the 1960s and 1970s, when, as the economy grew richer, we garnered longer life spans and more leisure -- older people lived longer AND retired earlier. 

To be clear, saving is hard for human beings that often lack foresight, discipline, and investing skills required to sustain a savings plan. Yet, humans in other nations have high savings rates... Our savings institutions, namely pension systems have changed which has caused the drop in retirement income. 

Here is the evidence that it is the change in pension institutions that are to blame for the drop in savings rates, not human nature. The deep decline in national savings rates showed up in the 1990s, when employers started to reduce their contributions into defined benefit pension plans. These plans were a main driver of national savings whereas the expansion of 401(k)-type plans did not boost savings overall because they simply supplanted already existing defined benefit plans. Under traditional plans retirement savings companies did the savings automatically; defined benefit plans are institutionalized, contractual forms of saving that happen automatically. Also, in DB plans, all employees are covered. Workers have little discretion about whether to save or spend. Workers can’t opt out; decide how much to invest, or take out lump sum payments without difficulty. savings today is done by individuals. 

One reason why savings rates increased when employers directly contributed to defined benefit pensions is because employees saved in other ways. When employers shrunk their role and workers were given the option to save in voluntary, tax-deferred accounts, many low and middle income workers just stopped having savings allocated to their accounts when they lost the DB plan. Higher-paid employees tended to switch their savings out of taxed accounts to the tax sheltered accounts. So what we see in real life may be a significant increase in savings by individuals in tax favored accounts; but we also see a decrease in other forms of net savings (taking into account the rise of credit card debt, home equity loans etc). This means that when you add up all these trends national savings rates plunged: the decrease in retirement savings done by companies on behalf of their employees, the transfer of savings from taxed to tax-favored accounts, and households taking on more debt.

In sum, the shift towards 401(k) plans increases tax expenditures, does little to expand retirement savings, and favors workers who need the help least. All told, the tax subsidies are not meeting a public purpose. The top heavy benefits for 401(k) plans create a sad paradox: since 1999, tax expenditures for retirement plans grew by 20 percent, while retirement plan coverage fell.

Employers are Winners in 401(k) Plans

 

If 401(k) plans are so bad, why are there so many of them? Though workers don’t gain much from 401(k) plans, some employers and Wall Street firms do. I followed 700 firms over 17 years and found that firms that adopted a 401(k) plan (whether or not they have adopted a pension plan) lowered pension expenses by 3.5 to 5 percent without sparking worker complaints. Since 401(k) plans are voluntary, many (about 20 percent) workers who can but don’t bother to contribute “leave money on the table” by not accepting the employer match. Employers’ contributions are 26 percent lower than they would be if everyone participated at the rate needed to obtain the maximum employer match. Employers could pay the match to every worker, comparably to what is done under defined benefit plans. However, because workers have to trigger the match by saving from their own pay and some don’t, 401(k) plans boost corporate profits by reducing employer contributions at the expense of retirement income security. 

Employers find sponsoring a 401(k) plan is considerably less expensive than sponsoring a defined benefit plan. Defined contribution plans are less costly (since they do not even attempt to provide reasonable retirement benefits for all employees, less risky because the employer does not bear the risk of investment loss as they would in a defined benefit plan, and can be funded with the employer’s own stock, not with hard cash. 

Investment Companies are 401(k) Beneficiaries

Wall Street firms collect over $40.5 billion annually in 401(k) fees. Yet, brokers and human resources professionals often tell workers that the fees paid by their accounts are zero. A good way to see what workers lose when they invest in a 401(k) plan rather than a group–based pension fund is to compare what each earns after fees are subtracted. A comprehensive study by Dutch and Canadian researchers Ron Bauer and Keith Ambachtsheer found that U.S defined benefit plans – where individuals do not direct the investment of their own accounts – earned a 2.66 percent higher return NET of fees on equities than did retail mutual funds. The superiority in returns is due to both the reduction in fees for large institutional investors and because the trustees of pension plans are better investors than the employees. In Canada, the skim was even higher; the retail mutual funds earned 3.16 percent less. (These shortfalls are the averages for the 25-year period between 1980 and 2004.) The gap makes sense – investing in retail funds means investors pay for advertising, shareholder profits, and glossy brochures. 

Add to the fee realities the fact that workers with a lack of investment savvy tend to buy high and sell low – because people follow the leaders and buy stock as it is rising in value and sell when it is falling. As a result, self-directed accounts generally earn much less than professionally managed funds. 

This isn’t just a leakage; it’s a levee break. Hidden from view, workers are unwittingly transferring huge sums of money to financial firms.

In summary: the reason 401(k) plans have failed as a retirement security delivery system is because the system is voluntary, commercially–based, and individually-directed. As a result:

• People do not save enough or consistently enough; 

• The system depends on people having investment skill and luck (which they generally lack); 

• The individual account-based commercial fees are high; 

• People take out lump sums rather than annuities;

• Voluntary annuity markets are too expensive, discouraging individuals from taking annuities; and 

• The government subsidy is based on a deduction system. People who get the tax deductions, for the most part, would have saved without the help. 

401(k) plans are not successful at encouraging workplace savings for retirement savings, even if lower income earners save in them. Much of the balances are eaten up or distributed before retirement for many good reasons. 

The sooner we admit that our 30-year experiment with 401(k) accounts is a failure, the sooner we can supplement everyone’s Social Security. 

Guaranteed Retirement Accounts: Long Term Solution to the Retirement Crisis

Because there is a long-run retirement crisis -- not in Social Security, but in the heavily tax-subsidized, private, voluntary, and commercial tier of our nation’s pension system -- over half of workers under 50 will fail to have sufficient income after age 65 to replace the bare necessity of 70 percent of their pre-retirement income, according to Boston College’s Retirement Risk Index.

Think of retirement income as the food pyramid. Social Security is at the base, like grains and vegetables; the middle tier where the fruits and meat belong is the employer-based system; and up at the top with the whiskey and chocolate is the private and personal savings. The crisis is in the top two layers of the pyramid, as employer pensions erode and debt swamps personal wealth. 

I propose Congress set up universal Guaranteed Retirement Accounts (GRAs) and rearrange the $80 billion of tax subsidies for individual retirement accounts -- 401(k)s and IRAs --- so that every worker contributes $600 to his or her GRA each year. All existing 401(k)s and IRA–like plans will retain their existing tax favored status. However, going forward, the incentives all workers will get from the government to save will be in the form of tax credits for their $600 contributions to the GRA. 

The GRA will accumulate without additional taxation to the worker. Workers will pay taxes on the earnings when the money is withdrawn from the GRA at retirement. 401(k) plans and IRA plans may work for some people who have them. They will still exist, but they will have to compete with a guaranteed government system and they will not enjoy the large tax breaks they have now because the subsidies are inefficient and largely ineffective. 

We have two options: the first one is expensive; but it keeps the 401(k) vendors happy. The second is more effective and cost effective. The first option keeps the existing 401(k)/IRAs system intact with all of its tax deductions that go to disproportionately to the top 6% of earners. The Guaranteed Retirement Account, with the GRA tax credits – the $600 (indexed) tax credit - just competes in the marketplace. The first option is expensive because the tax expenditures and the tax credit exist side by side. The second option uses the elimination of tax deductibility of new 401(k)/IRA to pay for the Guaranteed Retirement Account tax credits. In the second version the existing 401(k)/IRAs will be grand-parented-in; but, the money going in will not be tax advantaged. 

Every worker who does not participate in an equivalent employer-sponsored DB plan will save five percent of compensation through contributions into a Guaranteed Retirement Account (in addition to the Social Security contributions). (Employers could elect to pay for all or a portion of the workers’ share of the Guaranteed Retirement Accounts, if desired.) Workers would earn pension credits based on the accumulation of these deposits, plus a generous rate of three percent investment return, adjusted for inflation. An unpublished report by a leading consulting firm confirmed that the three percent real rate of return proposed for the Guaranteed Retirement Accounts is a conservative long-run estimate under a range of plausible investment strategies that a government agency could undertake and not take any substantial risk of underperforming.)

The five percent contribution target is derived from basic math: an average earner saving five percent of pay over a lifetime of work (i.e., from his twenties to his sixties) with a guaranteed three percent rate of return plus inflation could supplement his or her Social Security to achieve a 70 percent replacement rate at retirement. If the GRA had been in effect, an average earner reaching 65 today would have accumulated enough to pay about one percent for every year of service (inflation indexed) from the GRA -- this is equivalent to some of the average employer-sponsored defined benefit (DB) pensions in the marketplace.

This basic math, though, comes up against the basic reality that many Americans cannot afford to save that much. Therefore, this proposal provides that workers’ contributions would be mitigated by a $600 a year contribution from the federal government, indexed for inflation, which would be paid for by scaling back substantially the tax breaks for 401(k) type accounts. The $600 defrays the expense for most lower- and middle-class workers (it pays for all the contribution for a minimum wage worker). Employers could make an additional contribution to provide for some of the GRA benefit, and, and workers could also elect to add their own contributions to increase their GRA pension. 

Finally, workers could elect to have existing 401(k) accounts transferred into the GRA. Take a 55-year-old who had $50,000 in his 401(k) account in August and faces job loss and also, sadly, all hopes of retiring. Let him swap out the $50,000 for a Guaranteed Retirement Account, which means he will contribute 5% of pay until his normal retirement age at a guaranteed rate of interest of 3% real. This will yield something on the order of $500 per month beginning at his Social Security normal retirement age. Even though the economy is in downturn, a guaranteed income from his former 401(k) removes a significant source of the worker’s financial anxiety

Advantages of the Guaranteed Retirement Account 

If we rearrange the current tax incentives for retirement savings by switching from tax deductions for contributions to credits that become contributions, then the proposal moves us to more efficiency and fairness. Both high income earners and lower income earners see a benefit from a tax credit, which is not true with a tax deduction structure. The GRA plan is also fiscally responsible because the credits are revenue-neutral. This is how it works. Because the current tax breaks are deductions from income, high-income earners get more breaks than low-income workers. The result is shocking. Six percent of taxpayers with incomes over $100,000 per year get 50 percent of the tax subsidies. [see the studies from the Urban and Brookings Institution] And, for all this effort, the nation gets no extra savings and workers no extra retirement security because studies show that people substitute taxed accounts for tax- favored accounts. The most economic activity this system creates are for accountants who happily transfer money between accounts. I propose that all workers accumulate savings with universal tax credits for savings, rather than tax deductions that go only to the well-off few who would have saved anyway. 

Adding insult to injury is that this tax-incentive inefficiency is growing. The value of tax expenditures for defined contribution (DC) plans is projected to grow 49 percent while those for traditional DB plans are projected to fall by 2.1 percent between 2009 and 2013. [See EBRI on the analysis of the budget and the table below]

Tax Subsidies for Retirement Plans in 2009 (Billion of $)

Type of plan 

- 401(k), Individual retirement plans and "Keogh Plans" $75. 7 

- Defined Benefit Plans $49.5

Tax Subsidies' Growth for Retirement Plans 2009-13 (estimated)

- 401(k), Individual retirement plans and "Keogh Plans" +49.5%

- Defined Benefit Plans -8.9%

[EBRI calculations Original data from Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the Untied States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/]

In contrast to the voluntary nature of 401(k) plans, under which the most needy perceive an inability to save and therefore do not, Guaranteed Retirement Accounts require that people personally save for their own retirement. According to polls [see references], people want to save (even though they may not believe they can afford to do so). The GRA would permit people to save in a safe and secure way, as opposed to the fee-ridden, inefficient 401(k) self-directed account structure we have today. A government agency connected to the federal employees pension, the Thrift Savings Plan, and Social Security (for administration efficiency) and governed by a board of trustees representing workers, business, and the public, will invest GRA assets (workers’ contributions and the government subsidy) in a whole range of options. For example, the board of trustees could select any sovereign wealth funds like those in Alaska, Alabama, New Mexico, Wyoming, as well as many nations outside the US. The GRA funds will be invested across risky and non-risky assets for the long run to ensure the federal government can pay the three percent inflation-indexed rate of return to the GRA lifetime annuities. 

Guaranteed Retirement Accounts are mandatory savings and thus universal, provide adequate income, the money is locked away from the participant’s access until retirement, the payout is for a person’s life, and the accounts are efficiently managed and invested. The GRAs would accumulate a working-lifetime of contributions and would guarantee a reasonable rate of return. Although Social Security also has annuity payouts, they have a strong redistribution element towards low income families with lots of dependents. This provides a basic floor of benefits for even the lowest income worker. The GRAs, on the other hand, would permit the accumulation of benefits through actual contributions, paying benefits out based on what was actually contributed.

GRAs are better than the automatic IRAs or 401(k) plans proposed by the part of President Obama’s economic team, because they are mandatory and bypass the commercial system and because they do not impose complicated requirements on small- and medium-sized employers. GRAs do not force workers to face the risks IRAs and 401(k) force workers to face: the risks they won’t save enough because of high fees, reluctant savings habits, and wrong investment choices; the risk that financial markets will tank; the risk that inflation will erode their retirement income; and the risk that retirees will out-live their money. Society will face unnecessary losses with Automatic IRAs because, net of fees, 401(k) and other individual retirement accounts are among the lowest earning in the financial asset universe. Add in preretirement withdrawals and adverse selection in annuity markets, and it is clear that, with automatic IRAs, the inefficiency would become more entrenched and a dollar of retirement income would be more expensive to obtain. In some ways the automatic IRAs plan would create more problems. 

As I mentioned above, if we rearrange the tax deductions, the GRA plan is budget-neutral. If we allow tax breaks for the first $5,000 in voluntary 401(k) contributions, the plan will cost $25 billion per year. 

Disadvantages of GRAs 

Mutual funds and other commercial interests dependent on the 401(k) industry may perceive a disadvantage in GRAs because they will face pressure to lower fees, raise returns or both. Secondly, participants may want access to their savings before retirement, which they commonly have in the 401(k) or IRA structure. Therefore, Congress may consider subsidization of “precautionary” or “hardship” savings separate and apart from the GRA, but should assiduously avoid calling such accounts retirement savings. 

The other disadvantage to GRAs is timing. We should not institute mandated savings in a recession unless fiscal policy provides a massive short term stimulus, which appears to be in our futures. In the long run, however, in order to have a true retirement system, we have to have disciplined savings throughout the business cycles. Whereas stimulus packages are often intended to encourage spending by the public, it should not be the job of households to increase their debt to get the country as a whole out of recessions. 

A Political Opening for Mandatory Retirement Savings – Why Obama does not Go Far Enough 

Even before the financial crisis of September 2008, workers were catching on to the disadvantages of 401(k) savings. 

Surveys shows less than 50 percent of people think they will live comfortably in retirement, though most workers say they are personally responsible for their supplements to their Social Security benefits. Nonetheless, they want the government to help. Over 77 percent of people support mandating pensions. In 2006, HSBC bank asked 21,000 workers in 20 nations what the government should do about the expense of aging societies. On average, workers preferred compulsory savings to any other policy. A third of Americans responding to the survey wanted the government to force them to save more for retirement; far fewer, 16 percent, would support a tax increase; and, only nine percent wanted the government to reduce benefits. In October 2007, a whopping 91 percent of respondents told a Wall Street Journal poll that the government should do something to secure retirement and 41 percent said they were not hearing enough from the Presidential candidates about retirement income issues. 

Conclusion

American workers know we have a short term and long term pension crisis, not with Social Security, but with the employer pension system. The persistent lack of coverage – over half of our working population has no employer plan -- the erosion of DB pensions, and the appalling failure of 401(k) system of self-directed, voluntary commercial accounts, is the reasons why workers in their mid-fifties and younger are facing less retirement income security than their parents and grandparents did. 

This loss of retirement security is a reversal of fortune and the result of very specific flawed governmental policies that are biased toward 401(k) plans and against defined benefit plans, rather than the result of technological change or the logical consequences of global economic trends. The baby boomers’ parents were able to cobble together traditional pension plans and Social Security to replace a higher portion of their pre-retirement savings then most boomers will. That is the good news, oddly, because, in the past, we know that government policies eroded pensions, which means that new government polices can help secure workers’ retirement futures. If we make the changes suggested in this article, we can look back at the crisis and financial bailout and know we did some good. 

References and Sources

1. Who is in a 401(k) plan? See the Center for Retirement Research Boston College. 2004. "Eligibility and Participation in 401(k) Plans by Age, 2001 and 2004" http://crr.bc.edu/frequently_requested_data/frequently_requested_data.html accessed October 4, 2009. 

2. Polls that show people want a guaranteed pension: Madland, David. 2008. “Reforming Retirement: What the Public Thinks.” For the Georgetown University conference on “The Future of Retirement Security.” Held October 3, 2008. Department of History, HSBC Bank. “How should governments finance ageing populations” http://www.hsbc.com/1/PA_1_1_S5/content/assets/retirement/2006_for_news_release_final.pdf.) HSBC. 2007. “The Future of Retirement: What People Want.” http://a248.e.akamai.net/7/248/3622/7d1c0ed7aa1283/www.img.ghq.hsbc.com/public/groupsite/assets/ retirement_future/2006_for_what_people_want.pdf (accessed online February 2, 2007); Bright, WSJ.com November 2007 online Harris personal finance poll 

3. Why DB plans help boost savings rates and 401(k)s do not. Bosworth, Barry, and Lisa Bell. 2005. The Decline in Saving: What Can We Learn from Survey Data?” Unpublished draft written for the 7th Annual Joint Conference of the Retirement Research Consortium, “Creating a Secure Retirement” (Washington, DC, August 11-12, 2005). . Tax breaks are higher than actual savings. See Bell, Elizabeth Adam Carasso and C. Eugene Steuerle, “Retirement Savings Incentives and Personal Savings,”Tax Notes, December 20, 2004.for this provocative insight. Also DC plans do not expand pension coverage. From 1999- 2005, the correlation between defined benefit coverage growth rates and pension coverage growth rates was 79%, while the correlation between defined contribution and pension coverage growth rates was a negative 10%. Ghilarducci. Teresa. 2006. “Future Retirement Income Security Needs Defined Benefit Pensions.” Center for American Progress. www.americanprogress.org/kf/defined_benefit_layout.pdf Back in 1981, Congress rejected President Carter’s Pension Commission’s call to reconsider the social value of these tax breaks and create a mandatory universal pension system (MUPS). Because they are designed to meet a social goal there were always conditions on these tax breaks. When the federal income tax was implemented in 1913, employer pension contributions were given special tax treatment only if the managerial plans included most of the rank and file. This is in direct acknowledgement that the tax breaks were targeted to the wealthy. The wrangling -- over how many tax breaks that higher income employees get in exchange for how many lower paid workers are in employer pension plans -- continues to this day and is part of a healthy process of assessing if the federal government tax breaks have the intended effects. Instead, in that same year, Congress satisfied the lobbyists for executives and made way for 401(k) plans by creating a section of the tax code which allowed workers to save, pre tax, in plans at work. After Wall Street firms and consultants successfully marketed 401(k) plans, the rest -- to use a shop-worn phrase -- is a history we all know: 401(k)-type plans replaced traditional defined benefit (DBs) pensions.-- over 63% of pensions are DC plans; whereas, in 1975, most pensions were DBs.

4. Definition of 401(k) – type plans are defined contribution plans include and include the following: 401(k) plans [about 80% of participants in defined contribution plans are in 401(k) plans]; profit sharing plans; money purchase plans; individual retirement accounts; and 403(b) plans which are 401(k) plans for employees in the public sector.

5. A good paper on the distributional effects of the tax expenditures for DC plans: Burman, Leonard E.,William G. Gale,Matthew Hall, and Peter R. Orszag. 2004. “Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts.”Washington, D.C.: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Comments on the tax subsidies: Because the tax subsidies come in the form of tax deductions and not credits they are regressive. For example, if a lawyer earning $200,000 makes a $1000 contribution to his 401(k) plan, he reduces his income tax by $350. If his receptionist, earning $20,000, makes the same $1000 contribution (which is much less likely), she will save only $150 in taxes.

6. Employers save money when they adopt DC plans: Ghilarducci and Sun 2006. How Defined Contribution Plans and 401(k)s Affect Employer Pension Costs: 1981-1998.” With Wei Sun. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 5(2): 175-196 Some of this is because when employees “leave money on the table” they leave it on the employer’s table. I used information from Munnell and Sundén. 2004. Munnell, Alicia, and Annika Sundén. 2004. Coming Up Short: The Challenge of 401(k) Plans. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press to get participation rates, average contribution levels by earnings, the distribution of employees by earnings (Calculated from the CPS (2003) to make the three billion dollar estimate of savings for the emplopyers from a voluntary plan. The average savings per worker is $156, calculated for their sample of over 800 employees in one firm that the employer saved over $250 per older worker who did not participate in the 40(k) even when they were eligible. Choi, James J., Laibson, David I. and Madrian, Brigitte C.,$100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(K) Plans(August 2005). NBER Working Paper No. W11554. Fidelity’s (2004) annual report documents employers’ match behavior.

7. References on Fees: There are $2.7 trillion in 401(k) assets Employee Benefit Research Institute. 2007. “401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity” An Information Sheet from the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI). www.ebri.org/pdf/InfSheet.QDIA.23Oct07.Final.pdf. The average fee is over $700 per year and average fees are 1.5% of assets which equals $40.5 billion. evidence that individual accounts have worse returns than DB plans: Ambachtsheer, Keith, Bauer, Rob. 2007. “Losing Ground.” Canadian Investment Review; Spring, Vol. 20 Issue 1, pp. 8-14

Teresa Ghilarducci 

The New School for Social Research